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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-JUDICIAL CONTROL-VETERANS ADMINISTRATION'S
FINDINGS OF LAW AND FACT ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE IN GOVERNMENT'S SUIT TO
RECOVER SuMs'ALLEGEDLY DuE FROM VETERAN-An action was brought by
the United States to recover sums of money paid to a veteran as an employment readjustment allowance. It was claimed that the defendant was not
entitled to the money because of his misstatement of earnings. Prior to this
action, an administrative finding that the defendant had knowingly received the allowance contrary to law and was obliged to retun1 it was
approved by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs. The government maintained that section 705 of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act required
that the administrator's findings of law and fact be conclusive and binding on the court. The federal district court, held, complaint dismissed with
prejudice. It was not the congressional intent that the administrator's findings should have retroactive finality when the government is seeking the
recovery of pecuniary benefits already received by the veteran. United
States v. Owens, (E.D. Ark. 1957) 147 F. Supp. 309.
The statutory language of section 705 of the Servicemen's Readjustment
Act is sweeping and unequivocal. 1 In general, it prohibits the judicial
review of findings of law and fact made by the Administrator of Veterans'
Affairs.2 While constitutionality of this section has been upheld by those
courts that have had occasion to consider it,3 in each case the petitioner
was a veteran seeking judicial review of an administrative decision denying him right to future benefits. It is well recognized that since Congress
may place conditions upon federal gratuities such as veterans' benefits, it
may also place in an administrative agency the ultimate power to determine the validity of claims for such benefits.4 The courts have almost
uniformly respected the administrator's findings under these circumstances.5
148 Stat. 9 (1933), 38 U.S.C. (1952) §705: "All decisions rendered by the Administra•
tor of Veterans' Affairs ••• shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and
fact, and no other official or court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review
by mandamus or otherwise any such decision." In that part of the legislation concerned
with the duties, powers and functions of the Veterans Administration an almost identical
provision appears. 54 Stat. 1197 (1940), 38 U.S.C. (1952) §lla-2.
2 This type of provision is occasionally found in federal legislation creating administrative agencies with quasi-judicial functions. The language of the statute may vary from
"final,'' "final and conclusive" to the language used in §705, which seems unmistakably
to withdraw the jurisdiction of ti:::? courts. For similar federal statutes, and the judicial
reaction to them, see DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§238, 239 (1951).
s Barnett v. Hines, (D.C. Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 96, cert. den. 308 U.S. 573 (1939);
Commers v. United States, (9th Cir. 1947) 159 F. (2d) 248, cert. den. 331 U.S. 807 (1947).
4 Smith v. United States, (8th Cir. 1936) 83 F. (2d) 631; Barnett v. Hines, note 3
supra; Commers v. United States, note 3 supra.
5 United States ex rel. Farmer v. Thompson, (4th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 947; Hahn
v. Gray, Jr., (D.C. Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 625; Snauffer v. Stimson, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 155 F.
(2d) 861. But cf. Siegel v. United States, (E.D. N.Y. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 555, where court
held the findings were not reviewable but that it could order a rehearing by the administrator.
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A substantially different issue arises when the veteran has already received
the benefits and the government seeks to recover them, asserting that the
court is bound by the administrator's finding that the veteran now owes
the government. A few courts, under these circumstances, have acknowledged that they were obliged by section 705 not to review the findings,
and therefore gave judgment for the government. 6 The court in the principal case, recognizing that such a result might raise a serious constitutional
question,7 adopted a more liberal interpretation.8 Its ruling that the section in question prohibited judicial review only when the prospective
finality of the administrator's findings was challenged, and not when the
government sought recovery of money, has judicial support.9 Similar pro•
hibitions in other federal legislation have not prevented judicial review
when the courts felt review was desirable.10 That the facts of this case
merited such an interpretation of the statute cannot be doubted. To assume that Congress intended that section 705 should enable the government, by means of an informal hearing, to create for itself an invulnerable
cause of action for the recovery of gratuities paid to a veteran is inconsistent with the beneficent purpose of the legislation establishing veterans'
benefits.11 The dilemma posed by the unequivocal language of the statute
on the one hand, and the congressional intent on the other, is amicably
resolved in favor of the latter when it appears that only slight inconvenience results to the government from such an interpretation. By producing
proper evidence in court, the government can recover the sums paid without a possible deprivation of the individual's constitutional rights.

James M. Porter, S. Ed.

6 United States v. Perry, (E.D. N.C. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 443; United States v. Gudewicz, (E.D. N.Y. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 787; In re Rosa's Estate, 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 285, 172 Misc.
808 (1939).
7 At p. 314, the court quoted the opinion in Hormel v. United States, (S.D. N.Y.
1954) 123 F. Supp. 806 at 810: "•. . • the Government's construction . . . raises the
serious question whether the ,Fifth Amendment would not invalidate a law which would
permit the Government to recover a judgment against a citizen without giving him an
opportunity to challenge the bare assertion of an administrative officer that money
was due and owing.•• .' "
s ·when the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the federal courts will first
determine "whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question
may be avoided.'' Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 at 62 (1932). American Communications
Assn., CIO, v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1949), rehearing den. 339 U.S. 990 (1950). See also,
comment, 53 CoL. L. REv. 633 (1953).
9 Hormel v. United States, note 7 supra. See also United States v. Gibson, (9th Cir.
1953) 207 F. (2d) 161.
10 Whether the courts will review findings of federal agencies in the face of a statute
that seems to preclude review is not necessarily determined by the literal language employed in the statute, but will depend on the facts of each case. For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's position in this area, see Davis, "Unreviewable Administrative Action,"
15 F.R.D. 411 at 433-446 (1954). See also Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law:
1942-1951," 51 MICH. L. REV. 775 at 840-844 (1953).
llSee principal case at 314.
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